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In his The Reasons of Love, drawn from
lectures originally given in Princeton in 2000 and
University College London in 2001 , Harry Frankfurt
hopes to clarify the concepts of 'what is of interest,'
'what we care about,' and 'what it is we love' (11). In
the course of this clarification, however, the possibly
rich content of these issues is lost. His analysis is
almost impudently unsocial-theoretical. The project is
to show that the question about how one should live
is dependent upon what one cares about, and that
what one cares about is (at least partially) constitutive
of oneself and one's life as meaningful. Chapter one
sets up this general project and considers what it is to
care about something. Chapter two delineates the role
of love in guiding one's interests and cares. Chapter
three synthesizes these analyses by° arguing that selflove is the paradigmatic form of love and best guides
one into feeling at home with oneself.
Caring about something is a variation on
desiring or wanting . I may want ice cream or global
peace, for example without caring much about it, about
what variety it takes or when it happens. To care about
something is to be "willingly committed" to the desire
for that thing (16). Caring about is self-referential,
then, and is structurally related to who and how one
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is; it "binds us to ourselves (17). What this discussion lacks, unfortunately, is any
account of caring for something and its relation to caring about that thing. Can I
genuinely care about global peace if I do not also care for it by, say, refusing to
be dogmatic or by trying to convince others of a certain variety of it? The concern
intensifies when one considers the importance of caring about and caring for
others.
For Frankfurt, what counts as important arises from what we care about
(23); international law is only important to me if I care about global justice or the
like. To give reasons for how I ought to act is to state what is important to me. But,
to state this I must know what I care about. Frankfurt is right, then, to think that the
normative question cannot be the most basic; the factual question "What do I care
about?" must be more basic (26-8). Resolving the "hesitations of this question
requires "self-confidence," something afforded by loving something (28).
Loving something is a mode of caring about it. Loving is a kind of caring for
which one has no reasons. Rather, it is reason itself for behaving or living in some
way. "Love is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons for acting in the beloved's
interests (37). Thus love just is concomitant with the value 'found' in the beloved,
and in this sense one falls in love. According to Frankfurt, one distinctive feature of
love is that one cannot decide through deliberation to be in love. A second feature
is that a beloved's value is intrinsic and not instrumental. Third, love entails willing
what is good for the beloved simply because it is good for the beloved and not
for any concerns of the lover. Lastly, love cannot be an "impersonal" care, but is
"ineluctably" attached to the particularity of the beloved.
Here one sees the clearest signs of the text breaching its own limits.
Frankfurt seeks to treat love as a kind of care about something, which need not
be a person. The four characteristics could understandably apply to love between
persons, but make less sense when the beloved is something else. Do I love
global justice in its specificity and not because it is a kind of justice? Do I love it for
its intrinsic worth or because it brings about good ends?
For Frankfurt, self-love is the purest form of love and is the well of
confidence one needs to accept the constraints on action and desire which are
imposed by the love of something. Love of oneself is the most strictly disinterested
and particular to the beloved, the least in one's control to reject with any kind of
ease, and the identification between lover and beloved is clearest (81ff). Frankfurt
rightly modifies this to say that one can love oneself even without (knowing one's)
interests, by caring that one have the sorts of interests that operate as goals or
as beloveds. Only in the presence of such goals does a life become meaningfully
oriented (cf. 90). Loving oneself- as caring for the perdurance of one's own
guiding desires and values- is a kind of wholeheartedness or resoluteness in
willing which enables one to properly ask the normative question "How should I
live?"
11
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While the trajectory of his thinking is clear, Frankfurt's metaphorical use
of ·1ove' has ramifications. He cannot shake the intersubjective, social core of the
issue. He self-critically marks his dependency upon familial love as an example
(89). He sees this as a simplification because he wants his analysis of love to have
broader scope. But why not recognize the repeated irruption of parental love as
indicative of something essential or paradigmatic of love in general? Why persist in
trying to show self-love to be the purest kind of love when parental love is doing all
the heavy lifting? The praising of self-love in this way is surprising more for taking
an intersubjective emotion-but aren't they all?-as radically individualistic, than
for transgressing common moral thinking.
Despite doing harm to the meaning of love in order to give a certain
moral-psychological account, it is nonetheless promising to see this branch of
philosophy broaching issues previously ignored: being at home in the world and
with oneself, self-confidence, emotions generally, pre-normative bases for ethics.
Perhaps if these are thought through further, thinkers like Frankfurt will begin to
think from a more social or intersubjective basis.
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